Suchergebnisse

The wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s dramatically stimulated interest in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). To satisfy this interest from the outside world, many historical publications offered up various explanations for the outbreak of the wars.1 Yet the prior, and perhaps more significant, development occurred on the eve of the war, when historians in Bosnia and Herzegovina – although to a considerably lesser extent than in Serbia and Croatia – made an important contribution to national(ist) mobilisation and to the creation of a belligerent atmosphere by sensationally broaching traumatic topics linked to the Second World War.2 The war in the 1990s left behind a devastated and divided country and created deep social divisions which have also affected the role and status of the nation's historiography. Many today accept the claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country in which there exist three views on history, although this is only partly true, because in this country far more than 'three views on history' exist. In practice, the thesis of three national historiographies (Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak)3 turns out to be completely erroneous, because the existence of 'national historiographies' would also presume the existence of clearly defined thematic and methodological approaches to historical research, and that is not the case with historiography in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, it is more precise to speak of a scholarly historiography that exists alongside an ideologically or politically motivated historiography or 'parahistoriography', by which is meant 'dealing with history . . . in a completely different way than studying history'.4

Abstract
The author analyses the discourse about Kosovo in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) during the 1980s. During these years, Serbian media developed several stereotypes to discredit the political leaders of BiH and accuse them of fomenting unrest in Kosovo. The author assesses these stereotypical depictions as well as the response of the Islamic Community and political leadership in BiH to these accusations. He asks what the attitude of Serbia's political elite towards BiH was, and what role the Serbian political leadership played in the media attacks. He then investigates the evolution of the BiH leadership's stances towards the events in Kosovo between the beginning and the end of the 1980s. And finally, through a close reading of session minutes and media, he assesses the increasingly deviating views of the BiH political leaders vis-á-vis the situation in Kosovo.

U radu se na temelju arhivskih izvora i literature pokazuje na koji način je politička elita, koristeći akademsku zajednicu, pokušala onemogućiti izbor Muhameda Filipovića u zvanje vanrednog profesora na Univerzitetu u Sarajevu. Pokazan je kontekst u kojem se to odvijalo, tok diskusija na Vijeću nastavnika Filozofskog fakulteta 1968. godine, te na kraju iznosi teza da je ovaj primjer samo pokazatelj šireg odnosa politike i intelektualaca u vrijeme socijalizma.

At the end of the Second World War, Poles, who had come to Bosnia and Hercegovina as settlers at the beginning of the twentieth century, lived in the districts of Srbac, Prnjavor, Derventa, Laktasi, Bosanska Dubica, Prijedor, Doboj, Bosanski Brod, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Novi, Piskavica, Banja Luka, and to a lesser extent, they could be found in parts of the counties of Vares, Zenica, Teslic, Zavidovici and Sarajevo. There political situation was very unfavourable, and they were frequently the objects of various kinds of attacks and terror. Immediately following the war, they requested permission collectively to emigrate to Poland. This was allowed during 1946 on the basis of the protocol signed by Yugoslavia and Poland on January 2, 1946. Under its terms, each emigrant stated in writing that he was emigrating voluntarily and that he was relinquishing claim to all immovable property in Yugoslavia. The mass emigration began in November. In total, 2649 families numbering 14088 members left Bosnia and Hercegovina (this figure included 7405 children below eighteen years of age, 3501 adult women, and 3182 adult men). They left behind 6400 domesticated animals, 1784 homes, 12350.5 ha of arable farm land, and 1495.8 ha of forest. After the Poles emigrated, their lands and possessions were allocated for internal colonization. (SOI : CSP: S. 104)

The Bosnian Hercegovinian society, which immediately after the World War II was predominantly peasant, has undergone since 1953 some social transformations. In this article, the author attempts to explain ideological premises and basic features of economic policies, following transformations in agriculture and industry. At the end of the WW II, 80 per cent of the population of Bosnia and Hercegovina lived in villages, and only 2 per cent worked in factories. Communist regime, inspired by the Soviet economic policies, forced industrialization of the country, a process which placed the agriculture in the background. A low technical education of workers, however, did not allow significant changes of the agrarian society of BiH, even though some progress in industrial production was noted since 1953. This is the main reason why under the aegis of industrial development we witness a development of agrarian society. (SOI : CSP: S. 376)

Now that integration into Europe is on the public agenda, the discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tending to build up a narrative about Bosnia-Herzegovina that is not actually integrating but returning to Europe from which it was "torn away" when it joined the Yugoslav state in 1918. Similar narratives, characteristic of Croatia and Slovenia, may have found their way into Bosnia-Herzegovina too. Indeed, what happened to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1918 up to 1992, and was it really "abducted" from Europe where, as part of the Habsburg Monarchy, it had spent the last decades of the 19th and first decades of the 20th century? Has Bosnia-Herzegovina returned to the Balkans since 1918, where it had been up to 1878 and wherefrom, now in the early 21st century, it is trying to join Europe or - in line with this new narrative - is it once again
""making a break" for it? What, in this sense, are Bosniak, Croat and Serb experiences of Yugoslavia and what memories of Yugoslavia are they building in Bosnia-Herzegovina?